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MONEY MARKET FUNDS RUN RISK: WILL
FLOATING NET ASSET VALUE FIX THE
PROBLEM?
Jeffrey N. Gordon* and Christopher M. Gandia**
The instability of money market mutual funds (“MMF”), a
relatively new form of financial intermediary that connects
short-term debt issuers with funders who want daily
liquidity, became manifest in the financial crisis of 2007–
2009. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a major issuer of
money market debt, led one large fund to “break the buck”
(that is, violate the $1 net asset valuation convention (“NAV”))
and triggered a run on other funds that was staunched only
by major interventions from the U.S. Treasury and the
Federal Reserve. One common reform proposal has been to
substitute “floating NAV” for “fixed NAV,” on the view that
MMF run risk was strongly affected by the potential to
arbitrage between the “true” value of MMF assets and the $1
fixed NAV. It turns out that European MMFs are issued in
two forms, “stable NAV” and “accumulating NAV,” which
offer a reasonable proxy for the distinction between fixed and
floating NAV. Thus, the comparative run rate of these two
MMF types during “Lehman week” offers a natural
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Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership, Columbia Law
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** Associate in Financial Institutions practice group at a New York
City law firm. J.D., Columbia Law School; M.A., Applied Economics,
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James Madison University.
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supported Professor Gordon’s research on this article.
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experiment of the effect of NAV “fixedness.” We find that the
stable/accumulating distinction explains none of the crosssectional variation in the run rate among these funds.
Instead, two other variables are explanatory: yield in the
period immediately prior to Lehman week, which we take as a
proxy for the fund’s portfolio risk, and whether the fund’s
sponsor is an investment bank, which we take as proxy for
sponsor capacity to support the fund. We then argue that
these findings indicate that other stability-enhancing reforms
are necessary.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

Introduction ................................................................. 314
Prior Literature ........................................................... 332
European Money Market Funds ................................ 333
Data on European Money Market Funds .................. 335
Econometric Model and Results ................................. 346
A. Variables................................................................ 346
B. Results ................................................................... 349
C. Robustness Checks ............................................... 356
VI. Conclusion (and a Policy Coda) .................................. 358
A. The Current SEC Proposal .................................. 365
B. In Sum ................................................................... 368
Appendix ................................................................................ 369

I. INTRODUCTION
Money market funds (“MMFs”) were at ground zero of the
financial crisis.1
Lehman Brothers failed on Monday,
September 15, 2008. One day later, an important money
1 For detailed sources on the following account, see CONG. OVERSIGHT
PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND CONTINGENT
PAYMENTS IN TARP AND RELATED PROGRAMS 22–34 (2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT53348/pdf/CPRT111JPRT53348.pdf; INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET
WORKING
GROUP
47–67
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf [hereinafter MONEY MARKET
WORKING GROUP REPORT]; Naohiko Baba, Robert N. McCauley &
Srichander Ramaswamy, US Dollar Money Market Funds and Non-US
Banks, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2009, at 65.
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market fund, the Reserve Primary Fund, “broke the buck”
because of its holdings of Lehman short-term debt, even
though these holdings amounted to only 1.2% of the Reserve
Primary Fund’s portfolio, well below the 5% single-issuer
maximum set by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(“SEC”) rules.2 Immediately thereafter, investors—led by
institutional investors—began to withdraw from other
“prime” money market funds.3 During “Lehman week” these
withdrawals—call it a run—amounted to approximately
$300 billion, approximately 15% of prime money market
fund assets.4 Several other money market funds almost
broke the buck, rescued by interventions from their
sponsors.5
Pressure arose not because of the serial
bankruptcy of other issuers of money market instruments,
but rather from risk-fleeing investors who wanted to switch
to Treasury securities or cash. The redemptions exhausted
the funds’ cash and highly-liquid asset reserves.
As
redemption requests accelerated and as the short-term credit
market froze, funds faced the prospect of selling the
2 See SEC Rule 2a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(4)(i)(A) (2013). Money
market funds are a type of open-ended mutual fund, which are generally
valued on the basis of the “net asset value” (“NAV”) of their portfolios. As
elaborated below, money market funds are valued by convention at a $1.00
NAV, unless and until the actual NAV of the fund slips below $0.995, at
which point the fund is said to have “broken the buck.” CONG. OVERSIGHT
PANEL, supra note 1, at 22–23.
3 “Prime” funds may hold issuance of highly-rated non-governmental
issuers.
See Federated Financial Glossary, FEDERATED INVESTORS,
http://www.federatedinvestors.com/FII/leaf/display.do?category=Financial_
Glossary (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (defining “Prime Money Market
Funds” as funds which “offer the potential for comparatively higher yields
with the same attributes of all money funds governed by SEC Rule 2a-7:
credit quality, portfolio diversity and daily liquidity at par. Prime funds
invest only in high-quality, First or Second Tier money market
instruments and—like all 2a-7 regulated funds—have a dollar-weighted
average maturity not greater than 90 days and final maturity of the
individual security not greater than 397 days”).
4 MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.
5 See infra note 23 and text accompanying notes 69–70; see also
HENRY SHILLING ET AL., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., SPONSOR SUPPORT KEY
TO MONEY MARKET FUNDS 4–5 (2010).
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remaining assets at fire sale prices. The realization of such
shortfalls would have meant below-$1 net asset value
(“NAV”) at many funds. Indeed, the $0.97 valuation initially
anticipated from the Reserve Primary Fund liquidation,
which exceeded the 1.2% projected loss on its Lehman
holdings, reflected this phenomenon.6
The U.S. Government rode to the ultimate rescue. On
Friday, September 19, 2008 the Treasury announced a
“Temporary Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds.”7
6 The ultimate liquidation turned out somewhat better than
anticipated for the Reserve Primary Fund shareholders. As of June 2009,
the SEC expected the fund’s shareholders to receive $0.984, including
interest received after the Fund was closed. See Appendix to Order at 7–8,
SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co., 732 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (no. 094346), ECF No. 11, available at
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight
/reserve_primary_fund_investors/gardephe_order.pdf#distributionplan.
The fund’s investors ultimately received slightly more, $0.99, in large part
because of higher realizations on Lehman Brothers securities in
bankruptcy. The final payout came in July 2011. None of these
valuations takes account of the shareholders’ lost liquidity during the
period. See SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co. (In re The Reserve Fund Sec. and
Derivative Litig.), 732 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); SEC v.
Reserve Mgmt. Co. (In re The Reserve Fund Sec. and Derivative Litig.),
673 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Fund Update: Additional
Information Regarding the Primary Fund-In Liquidation, PRIMARY FUND
IN
LIQUIDATION (July 29, 2011), http://www.primary-yieldplusinliquidation.com/pdf/FundUpdate-July2011.pdf.
7 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces
Temporary Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/hp1147.aspx. The Congressional Oversight Panel reports
that 1486 MMFs participated, representing $3.2 trillion (93% of the
industry total). CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 1, at 28. Presumably
most of the uninsured funds invested solely in Treasury securities. That
many “government” funds participated may reflect investments in
“agency” securities, debt issued by the “Government-Sponsored Entities,”
(“GSEs”), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were then in
conservatorship and whose debt was trading at below par. The program
was extended twice, finally expiring a year later. The Treasury collected
$1.2 billion in fees but was never called to perform on its guarantee. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Expiration
of Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 18, 2009), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg293.aspx.
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This program, capitalized by the then-$50 billion Exchange
Stabilization Fund, offered a U.S. government guarantee on
all existing deposits in participating money market funds, in
effect, the entire $3.5 trillion industry.8 On the same day, the
Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) announced it would use
emergency powers to create a credit facility to fund no-risk
bank purchases of asset-backed commercial paper from
MMFs, the “Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility” (“AMLF”).9
These
purchases, at amortized-cost, were funded by non-recourse
Fed loans matched to the maturity of the purchased assets.
Asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”) constituted, as a
class, the dodgiest money market instruments on offer, since
they largely represented claims on pools of mortgage-backed
securities and other receivables created off-balance sheet by
various financial institutions. Ordinarily, loans against
securities like ABCP would be over-collateralized to protect
the Fed against loss, but the structural inability of MMFs to
bear loss required a concessionary set-up. Moreover, the Fed
lent money to fund the ABCP purchases at its primary credit
rate, which meant that the banks earned a spread between
the ABCP rate and the Fed rate. Both of these moves
contradicted the Bagehot dictum for central bank behavior in
a crisis: to lend freely to solvent firms against good collateral

CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 1, at 5, 24, 43.
See Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/abcpmmmf.htm (last visited
Apr. 24, 2014); Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, FED. RESERVE
DISC. WINDOW, http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/mmmf.cfm (last visited
Apr. 24, 2014). For information about AMLF facilities generally, see
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES TO SUPPORT
OVERALL MARKET LIQUIDITY: FUNCTION, STATUS, AND RISK MANAGEMENT
59–66 (2010) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT]; Burcu DuyganBump et al., How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity
Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, 68 J. FIN. 715, 718–24 (2013).
8
9
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at a penalty rate.10 Why? Apart from liquidity support, the
Fed
was
also
protecting
Treasury’s
somewhat
undercapitalized guarantee by taking the credit risk on the
most fragile MMF assets.11 The Treasury guarantee was
never called upon, but the Fed lent out $150 billion under
this program in its first ten days.12
Because of the shrinkage of prime MMF assets, and
because of the shift by those MMFs to Treasury securities,
parties that counted on such financing faced an immediate
funding crisis. The Fed therefore created an additional
emergency facility, the “Commercial Paper Funding
Facility,” to support commercial paper issuers, especially
asset-backed securitization vehicles, which could no longer

10 WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY
MARKET 187–88 (14th ed. 1915).
11 The Fed expanded the capabilities of institutions to access the
AMLF on January 30, 2009. The expanded capabilities provided (1) a
temporary limited exception eliminating any capital requirements for
purchases of ABCP through the facility and (2) a temporary limited
exception to sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. See
INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 62–63. These exemptions
effectively reduced the cost of purchasing ABCP (eliminating capital
requirements) and removed limitations on the quantity of ABCP an
institution could purchase from a sponsored MMF. The need for these
exemptions also points to a limitation in the strategy of sponsor support
for struggling MMFs, since many fund complexes could not be supported
within the existing affiliate-lending constraints that applied to banks.
12 See Duygan-Bump et al., supra note 9, at 724–25 (observing that
use of the AMLF was widespread among MMFs––105 MMFs participated,
participation being heaviest among institutional funds). Treasury charged
for its guarantee; the Fed did not. See Summary of Terms for the
Temporary Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds, DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/
Domestic-Finance/Documents/TermSheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2014);
see also Ben Levisohn & Daisy Maxey, Absent Help, More Funds Might
Have
Broken
Buck,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Dec.
1,
2010,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487045948045756488
72562084814 (noting that nine of the ten largest MMFs, representing twothirds of all MMF assets, used the AMLF. Only Vanguard did not use the
emergency credit facility).
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count on purchases from money market funds.13 In its first
week (starting on October 27, 2008), this federal facility
bought $144 billion in commercial paper. Maximum use of
this facility peaked at $350 billion in January 2009.14
These large-scale government interventions successfully
halted the run and stabilized money markets.15 At year-end
2008, prime MMFs had virtually the same level of assets as
at year-end 2007.16
Addressing the fragility of money market funds has been
a major post-crisis regulatory objective. In 2010, the SEC
adopted changes to the rule under the Investment Company
Act of 1940 that governs MMFs, so as to raise standards on
portfolio securities, shorten maturities, increase liquidity
requirements, and spell out orderly liquidation procedures
13 See Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough & Dina Marchioni, The
Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y. REV., May 2011, at 25, 34, available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/11v17n1/1105adri.pdf.
14 Id. at 35; see also INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 77
fig.7-3. European banks also faced a funding crisis because U.S. MMFs,
which had been the major purchasers of dollar-denominated certificates of
deposit issued by these banks, withdrew from this market. The Fed
entered into uncapped swap lines with European central banks that
amounted over $200 billion. See Baba et al., supra note 1, at 76–77.
15 The Fed also created the Money Market Investor Funding Facility
(“MMIFF”) on October 21, 2008. The MMIFF created a special purpose
entity (“SPE”) to purchase the assets of MMFs with 90% cash and 10%
subordinated commercial paper issued by the SPE. Effectively, the
participating MMFs would collectively self-insure and take the first 10%
loss on the combined assets purchased under MMIFF. MMFs never
participated in the facility, as the MMFs were unwilling to assume any
risk. See INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 81, 85–89. The
creation of the MMIFF shows the Fed’s resolve to support MMFs during
the financial crisis. More revealing is the way the absence of capital
constrains the kind of liquidity support the Fed can provide. As the
comparison between the AMLF and the MMIFF demonstrates, MMFs
cannot take the usual “haircut” associated with collateralized loans from a
lender of last resort. This means that Fed liquidity support will entail
risk-bearing that is not customary for a lender of last resort, effectively
subsidizing the industry.
16 INV. CO. INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE FACT BOOK 180
tbl.39 (2013), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf.
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for firms that “break the buck.”17 However, a wide range of
discussants inside and outside of the government have
regarded these SEC actions as insufficient or incomplete,18
perhaps even counter-productive.19
17 See Money Market Fund Reform, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060 (Mar. 4,
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). See Jill Fisch & Eric Roiter, A
Floating NAV for Money Market Funds: Fix or Fantasy?, 2012 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1003, 1017–28 (2012).
18 See generally DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION 10, 14 (2009) (proposing establishment of the Financial
Services Oversight Counsel, to identify systemic risks, and the Consumer
Financial Protection Agency, to protect consumers from unfair and
deceptive practices), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf; MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP
REPORT, supra note 1, 69–119 (recommending liquidity requirements;
portfolio maturity limits; increased credit quality standards; enhanced
risk disclosure requirements); GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A
FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 24–56 (2009), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/G30Report.pdf [hereinafter
GROUP OF THIRTY] (proposing four core recommendations for reforming the
policies, practices, and market standards of the financial system, and
create a more robust infrastructure for promoting transparency within
financial markets); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS: MONEY MARKET
FUND
REFORM
OPTIONS
3–6,
13–35
(2010),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/10.21%
20PWG%20Report%20Final.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP
REPORT] (stating that “more should be done to address systemic risk and
the structural vulnerabilities of MMFs to runs” and suggesting floating
NAV, private emergency liquidity facilities for MMFs, and other
safeguards); SQUAM LAKE GRP., REFORMING MONEY MARKET FUNDS 1, 3–8
(2011), available at http://www.squamlakegroup.org/Squam%20Lake
%20MMF%20January%2014%20Final.pdf (observing that, despite the
changes in the SEC rules, “money market funds continue to pose
significant systemic risk” and arguing for a floating NAV and a regulatory
buffer requirement for stable NAV funds).
19 For example, the SEC’s post-2008 reforms shortened portfolio
maturities. This may enhance liquidity, but it also makes it easier for
funds to not roll over their assets, which adds to systemic fragility because
of the immediate funding shortfalls on the demand side. The shortened
maturities will also change the composition of MMF portfolios. Nonfinancial firms are not well-equipped to use short-term liabilities to
finance long-term assets. Thus, financial firms, which specialize in such
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Exactly what further policy intervention to take has been
contentious.20 The industry prefers an emergency liquidity
facility—in effect a discount-window version of the support
provided by the Fed during the crisis.21 Some parties,
including former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, have endorsed
a floating NAV approach, based on the view that the
dynamics of a fixed NAV significantly figures into run risk.22
maturity transformation, will increase their share of MMF financing.
Indeed, this has already occurred. See infra Chart C; see also Money
Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 78 Fed. Reg. 36,834,
36,835 (June 19, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239, 270,
274, 279) [hereinafter 2013 SEC MMF Reform Proposal]. As the financial
crisis demonstrated, financial firm solvency is likely to be highly
correlated. Thus the effort to address stability by enhancing liquidity may
well undermine stability by creating correlated solvency risk.
20 Some think there is no problem to be addressed. See, e.g., Jonathan
Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds
as Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 131, 162–73 (2011) (arguing that further reforms, particularly those
suggested by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, would
actually increase systemic risk in MMFs).
21 See Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, CEO, Inv. Co. Inst., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/11_sec_pwg_com.pdf (providing the Investment
Company Institute’s views on the President’s Working Group Report on
Money Market Fund Reform).
22 See
generally GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 18, at 29
(Recommendation 3). Additionally, the reason for former Fed Chairman
Volcker’s support for a move to a floating NAV may involve a desire to see
funds move from the MMFs to the banking sector. For example, see Paul
Volcker’s response to a question on how the proposal for the Volcker Rule
focuses banks on commercial activities:
[The purpose of the Volcker Rule is to] remov[e] the
temptation [for banks] to get highly involved in more
speculative type of activities where the immediate returns
may seem to be very high and you have got some very
highly paid people who want to keep that kind of activity
going. . . . [T]here is a question about money market
mutual funds, that they originated in a kind of regulatory
arbitrage some years ago because they did not have to put
up with some of the restrictions that banks put up with,
and they have attracted trillions of dollars. And if more of
those dollars were in the banking system, I think the
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Other parties favor a loss-absorbency layer for each fund—in
effect, capital. Currently, a fund’s capacity to absorb loss
from a defaulting security or a security that trades below its
amortized cost depends upon the sponsor’s willingness to
cover the shortfall.23 As in the case of the Reserve Primary
Fund, a sponsor may be unable to cover such a loss or
unwilling to do so.24

incentive to lend, whether to businesses or homeowners or
whatever, would be greater. That is an area where the
Administration has made some proposals, and I think it
ought to be taken seriously.
Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank
Holding Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, &
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 34 (2010) (statement of Paul Volcker,
Chairman, President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board) (emphasis
added).
23 Former SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro recently referred to an
internal SEC study that identified sponsor support on more than 300
occasions since the first MMF offerings in the 1970s. Perspectives on
Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms: Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC). See also Henry Shilling & Dagmar H.
Silva, US Money Market Fund Proposals Are Credit Positive for Investors;
Negative for Sponsors, MOODY’S WKLY. CREDIT OUTLOOK, July 2, 2012, at
30–31, available at http://www.risk-compliance-association.com/Moodys
_to_the_members_of_the_International_Association_of_Risk_and_Complia
nce_Professionals_July_2_2012.pdf (reporting at least 201 instances of
sponsor support from 1980 through 2011). Searching through SEC noaction letters, Kacperczyk and Schnabl found forty-seven instances of
sponsor support during 2008. Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, The
Risk-Taking Incentives of Money Market Funds 37–38 (Feb. 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/7588.
For other estimates of the extent of sponsor support of MMFs during the
financial crisis, see infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
24 These risks become greater as concentration in the MMF industry
grows. As of May 31, 2012, approximately 50% of MMF assets were held
by funds of five sponsors. The top three sponsors, Fidelity, JP Morgan
Chase, and Federated, account for approximately 35% of MMF assets. The
top ten sponsors account for approximately 75% of MMF assets. See
Largest Money Fund Managers, CRANE DATA, http://cranedata.com (last
visited Apr. 24, 2014).
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For a time, disagreement among the SEC Commissioners
blocked consideration of further regulatory action; this
deadlock provoked the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(“FSOC”) into offering its own proposals for MMF reform.25
Three reform options were offered: (1) floating NAV; (2) a
combination of a sponsor-supplied NAV capital buffer and a
“minimum balance at risk” for MMF users;; and (3) a higher
level of sponsor-supplied NAV buffer and other risk-reducing
measures.26 Fearful of losing its regulatory autonomy (and
after a change of Chairs), the SEC finally came forward with
its own reform proposals.27 Two major proposals are on offer:
floating NAV for institutional funds, fixed NAV for the rest;
and retention of fixed NAV, but liquidity fees or “gates” on

25 See Proposed Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual
Fund Reform, 77 Fed. Reg. 69,455 (Nov. 19, 2012) (recommendations of
the Financial Stability Oversight Council) [hereinafter FSOC Proposed
Recommendations]. The FSOC Proposed Recommendations emanated
from its separate authority to address systemic risks apart from actions of
the primary regulator.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 113, 120, 124
Stat. 1376, 1398–1402, 1408–10 (2010). In the face of deadlock at the
SEC, the FSOC’s 2012 Annual Report identified money market funds as
presenting “structural vulnerabilities in wholesale short-term funding
markets” that required “structural reforms.” FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 11–12 (2012), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/annual-report.aspx.
The
FSOC can make specific recommendations to the SEC and thereby force a
resistant SEC to offer public explanation. See Dodd-Frank Act § 120, 12
U.S.C. § 5330 (2012). Or, the FSOC can determine that specific MMFs or
sponsors “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United
States” and remit them to prudential supervision by the Federal Reserve.
Dodd-Frank Act § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323.
26 In functional terms, the “minimum balance at risk” proposal called
for a hold-back of 3% of an MMF investor’s funds (over $100,000) for thirty
days. This was designed to reverse the first-mover advantages of early
redemption and thus avoid “run” dynamics at times of financial stress. See
FSOC Proposed Recommendations, supra note 25, at 69,470–73
(describing the minimum balance at risk proposal).
27 See 2013 SEC MMF Reform Proposal, supra note 19, at 36,961
(proposing reforms intended to shorten portfolio maturities, among other
things).
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investor redemptions at times of financial stress, both
measures optional with the fund.
Floating NAV has been a favorite reform strategy because
it eliminates the regulatory artifact (to adopt a more neutral
term than “distortion”) that distinguishes money market
funds from other mutual funds.28 Rule 2a-7 permits MMFs
to report a fixed $1 NAV as long as the difference between
the market value of the fund’s portfolio and its aggregate
amortized cost does not exceed a $0.005 band. That is, if a
fund’s NAV is greater than or equal to $0.995, it can report a
$1.00 NAV. Proponents claim that floating NAV will reduce
run risk because (1) it would eliminate the fund users’
incentive in distressed markets to arbitrage between the
$1.00 and the actual market value, (2) it will condition
investors to understand that “markets fluctuate” so that a
decline in market prices does not necessarily signal an
imminent default on portfolio securities, and (3) it will
relieve sponsors of the implicit guarantee of zero investor
losses that can lead to unrealistic expectations of safety.29
28 For a useful account of the regulatory history of amortized cost
accounting for MMFs and a defense of the practice, see Fisch & Roiter,
supra note 17, at 1007–17. For an account of the MMF industry’s early
successful campaign for SEC permission to use fixed NAV, see William A.
Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV.
1155, 1160, 1174–77 (2010). In 1983, the SEC granted class-wide relief
permitting fixed NAV. Valuation of Debt Instruments and Computation of
Current Price Per Share by Certain Open-End Investment Companies
(Money Market Funds), Investment Company Act Release No. 13,380, 48
Fed. Reg. 32,555 (July 18, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
29 See 2013 SEC MMF Reform Proposal, supra note 19, at 36,850–51.
On this view, breaking of the buck by even a single fund can trigger a run
because of the high salience demonstration that sponsor support for a
threatened MMF is merely common practice not a sure thing, and that
such support will be based on separate sponsor calculations of convenience
and capacity. The 2007 asset-backed commercial paper crisis shows the
importance of this sponsor practice in maintaining stability. Although
thirty-nine funds received sponsor support, through low visibility
interventions, investors did not run on MMFs; to the contrary, MMF
inflows increased from investors seeking a safe haven. Yet a regime that
depends on implicit third party guarantees is inherently unstable, if only
because the implicit guarantor does not internalize the cost of its defection
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Opponents, especially institutional users, say that floating
NAV will destroy the utility of MMFs, because it would
create significant tax, accounting, and disclosure problems.30
Skeptics wonder whether floating NAV has much effect
on run risk. The purported arbitrage operates over a very
limited range, one-half of a penny. That’s a maximum of
$50,000 on a $10 million portfolio, not taking into account
transaction costs. Not a trivial amount but not compelling.
Moreover, investors are unlikely to have the real-time
pricing information that would encourage such arbitrage.
Large MMF portfolios typically contain dozens of securities
and many money market instruments do not trade. Instead,
the strongest reasons for a run on an MMF are the same as
for an uninsured bank account: uncertainty about the full
payment of principal and a prisoner’s dilemma dynamic in
which the first party to withdraw stands the greatest chance
of a full recovery. Withdrawal (immediate redemption from
a fund) is rational whenever the current redemption price is
higher than the “true” NAV or is significantly likely to be
higher. This circumstance may arise in the case of fixed
NAV, in the gap between $1 and $0.995, but it is also true in
the case of floating NAV, because in a crisis that increases
the default risk for MMF assets, today’s NAV is likely to be a
lagging, higher indicator of “true” NAV.

from the implicit arrangement. This then leads to the argument that
floating NAV will enhance stability because it will avoid creating
unsustainable expectations of sponsor support in difficult times. See
Patrick E. McCabe, The Cross Section of Money Market Fund Risks and
Financial Crises 3, 35 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series,
Working
Paper
No.
2010-51,
2010),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1898341.
30 Opponents may also believe that the desire to eliminate the utility
of MMFs is the point of various reform proposals, including floating NAV,
the goal of which is to make banks the exclusive provider of transaction
accounts. That is, even if floating NAV does not in fact reduce run risk, it
will lead many MMF users to turn to banks instead because of the
transactional conveniences of a fixed dollar account. So, MMFs will be less
of a systemic threat because they will be smaller. See Fisch & Roiter,
supra note 17, at 1006.

Gordon - final

326

4/27/2014 3:40 PM

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2014

To unpack this point: money market assets are likely to
present a highly correlated risk of default or loss of value
because they mainly consist of short term credit issuances of
financial firms and their affiliates.31 Financial firms are
often deeply linked to one another through various
counterparty relationships;; firms may “herd” in a way that
produces similar business strategies.
Both routes of
systemic distress propagation mean that the failure of a
significantly important financial firm is likely to lead to
defaults, or the threat of default, on securities held by many
MMFs. But since the short-term financial claims held by
MMFs typically do not trade on secondary markets, asset
prices will be relatively slow to adjust “stale” prices. 32
Investors also know that redemption by other investors at
today’s higher stale price will further reduce tomorrow’s

31 As of May 31, 2012, at least 80% of the non-governmental assets of
prime MMFs were short-term claims on large banks; most of these assets
were claims on large foreign banks. See Perspectives on Money Market
Mutual Fund Reforms: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 126 ex. 1 (2012) (testimony of David
Scharfstein, Edmund Cogswell Converse Professor of Finance and
Banking, Harvard Business School) [hereinafter Scharfstein Testimony]
(relying on Crane Data). See also HENRY SHILLING, MOODY’S INVESTORS
SERV., MONEY MARKET FUNDS 2010 REVIEW AND 2011 OUTLOOK 1–2 (2011)
(estimating that more than two-thirds of assets of prime MMFs and tax
free MMFs are directly or indirectly exposed to banks). A secular trend to
this effect can be established by analyzing the Federal Reserve Board’s
Commercial Paper Release (financial v. non-financial categorization) in
conjunction with Flow of Funds data on commercial paper held by MMFs.
See infra Chart B.
32 See Dan Covitz & Chris Downing, Liquidity or Credit Risk? The
Determinants of Very Short-Term Corporate Yield Spreads, 62 J. FIN. 2303,
2305 (2007); Duygan-Bump et al., supra note 9, at 720. A recent SEC staff
study underscores the liquidity costs of a crisis. The buy-sell spread on
even the highest quality prime securities significantly widened, to
approximately fifty-one basis points, which indicates the expectation of
lagging prices. See SEC DIV. OF ECON. & RISK ANALYSIS, LIQUIDITY COST
DURING
CRISIS
PERIODS
(2014),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-321.pdf.
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NAV.33 Investors will therefore run even without a buck to
break.
In short, the circumstance that produces genuine concern
that the fund may break the buck and therefore will trigger
a run on a fixed NAV fund will also produce strong concern
that MMF assets will generally decline in value, which is
sufficient to trigger a run on a floating NAV fund. Floating
NAV run risk is a combination of two factors: a correlated
expected decline in asset values and “stale pricing.”34 Thus,
an investor in a floating NAV fund will have powerful
incentives to exit ahead of an advancing wave.35

33 This is because there are proportionately fewer investors to bear
the losses in a now-smaller pool of assets. See Qi Chen et al., Payoff
Complementarities and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Mutual Fund
Outflows, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 239, 240 (2010) (stating that “[b]ecause mutual
funds conduct most of the resulting trades after the day of redemption,
most of the costs are not reﬂected in the NAV paid out to redeeming
investors, but rather are borne by the remaining investors. This leads to
strategic complementarities—the expectation that other investors will
withdraw their money reduces the expected return from staying in the
fund and increases the incentive for each individual investor to withdraw
as well—and ampliﬁes the damage to the fund.”). In other words, where
actual NAV is below realized NAV, each redemption increases the losses
for remaining investors, because the embedded loss is distributed across a
smaller investor base. This is easiest to see in the case of a fixed NAV
fund, where the $1.00 redemption amount may be greater than the
“shadow” NAV. But the same problem arises for a floating NAV fund
because of the stale pricing problem.
34 Fixed NAV fund prices at a time of systemic distress are stale as a
result of regulatory structure––the gap between $1.00 and actual or
“shadow” NAV. Floating NAV fund prices in similar circumstances will be
stale because of the structure of the relevant asset markets.
35 Consider the example in the President’s Working Group Report as
to how fixed NAV may induce a run. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP
REPORT, supra note 18, at 19–20. First, there is a default on a portfolio
security, which leads to a meaningful reduction in Fund Alpha’s actual
NAV. Investors in Alpha redeem to arbitrage the difference between the
$1.00 fixed NAV and the actual NAV; this may lead to wide-scale
redemptions and quick sales by Alpha of fund assets to raise cash to meet
redemption requests, in other words, a run. But what produces contagion
from the run on Alpha to other MMFs is the correlation risk between the
defaulting security and many other money market instruments. First,
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Similarly, utilizing floating NAV as a means to
desensitize investors to fluctuating MMF valuations seems
to misperceive what drives a systemic MMF run: it is not the
breaking of the buck at any particular fund, but rather a
high-enough probability that the underlying portfolio
event(s) that produced a break will correlate across MMFs
generally.36
The prior instance of buck-breaking—the
Community Bankers Mutual Fund in 1994—provides an
instructive example.37 The fund broke the buck because of
such correlation may produce a fire sale valuation externality (meaning:
the depressed asset valuations from Alpha’s sales may force other firms to
report lower NAV). Second, investors may also come to believe that
similar securities will also default, and they will want to redeem before
realization of such losses. But note: correlated default risk will produce a
run even without fixed NAV. The default of a money market security may
lead investors at other funds to run not because they are trying to
arbitrage a gap but because they want to avoid the realization of loss.
36 Professors Fisch and Roiter argue that the main reason for MMF
run risk is not investors’ fear of loss on MMF portfolios but rather lost
liquidity because of uncertain consequences should a fund break the buck.
Their solution is either conversion of the fund to floating NAV (meaning
immediate loss realization for investors reflected in NAV), or, for
liquidating funds, in effect, a partial suspension of convertibility.
Specifically, investors would be able to redeem part of their investment,
pending a final winding up of a fund. See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 17, at
1045–47. Another way to frame the Fisch & Roiter point is to say that
fixed NAV adds a distinct vector of run pressure. This pressure is not
found in floating NAV funds because breaking the buck triggers a
liquidation that deprives investors of liquidity for a substantial period,
even if the ultimate losses are relatively small. The liquidity costs of a
fixed NAV fund’s breaking the buck are addressed in detail in Patrick E.
McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the
Systemic Risks Posed by Money Market Funds 12, 31 (Fed. Reserve Bd.
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2012-47, 2012),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201247/
201247pap.pdf. Such liquidity risk seems secondary to the underlying
correlated solvency risks that are fundamental to a systemic run, although
streamlining of the liquidation process to reduce the liquidity costs seems
highly desirable.
37 See John E. Backlund, Securities Act Release No. 7626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 23639, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
1783, 1999 WL 8164 (Jan. 11, 1999) (enforcement action brought
subsequent to fund’s breaking the buck). A Federal Reserve policy change
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valuation changes in a portfolio “unsuitably” concentrated
(27%) in interest-rate sensitive structured notes. The fund
was small (only $130 million), its portfolio concentration
violated the SEC rule, and the securities did not default. The
fund’s idiosyncratic investment strategy (and small size)
meant that the industry did not suffer a run.38 By contrast,
the Reserve Primary Fund ($60 billion) held defaulted-upon
securities of a large financial firm (Lehman) at a time of (1)
high concentration of MMF assets in the financial sector and
(2) increasing and correlated instability among financial
firms.39 In other words, it appears that the correlation of
possible portfolio losses rather than the “focal point” effect of
a buck-breaking was the main driver of the MMF run. These
portfolio losses can arise not only through defaults but also
through fire sale prices on non-faulted assets as funds
scramble to meet redemption requests.40
The point is this: unless floating NAV significantly
reduces run risk relative to fixed NAV, it will not produce
systemic stability. Instead, one of the other proposals on
offer becomes necessary. Since the Fed has shown no desire
to become lender of last resort to MMFs, loss-absorbing
capital becomes the obvious alternative.41

that abruptly raised short-term interest rates reduced the valuation of
money fund instruments generally.
38 An additional factor in avoiding a run was that money market fund
sponsors stepped up to provide support to forty-three of the 963 thenregistered MMFs. See 2013 SEC MMF Reform Proposal, supra note 19, at
36,834, 36,840 tbl.1.
39 See infra Charts A and C.
40 Economists sometimes refer to this as a “cash in the market”
problem. Even if investors believe that particular assets are undervalued
at today’s price, they will postpone buying if they also believe that
tomorrow’s price will be even lower.
41 The industry apparently prefers the status quo. That would be
roughly the result of adopting the SEC’s proposal of optional liquidity fees
and gates for fixed NAV funds. Investors have historically relied on
sponsors’ implicit guarantees of MMF solvency. The SEC proposal would
invite investors to rely upon sponsors’ implicit guarantees of MMF
liquidity. See infra text accompanying notes 95–96. Against the argument
that a financial institution that engages in liquidity transformation
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This Article takes advantage of a natural experiment
presented by European money market funds to provide
empirical evidence on that run-risk question. Although all
U.S. MMFs are fixed NAV funds, money market funds
offered in Europe come in both “stable NAV” and
“accumulating NAV” varieties. A “stable NAV” fund is
equivalent to the “fixed” U.S. counterpart.
An
“accumulating” fund does not maintain fixed NAV and, while
it does not fully “float,” it does offer a useful proxy for the
effects of a “floating NAV” fund.
We examined the
performance of these European MMFs during Lehman week
to test the factors that contributed to run propensity.
Although virtually all funds experienced a significant run,
the only internal factor that consistently predicted extra run
propensity in our various models was ex ante risk, proxied by
reported yield before Lehman week. By contrast, the
difference in run propensity between stable and

without the backing of a creditworthy insurer, a lender of last resort, or
loss-absorbing capital will present a systemic hazard, the industry
response appears to be that, like it or not, the Federal Reserve will be
obliged to support MMFs during a financial crisis. See Letter from John
D. Hawke, Arnold & Porter LLP (on behalf of Federated Investors), to
Hon. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (Aug. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-107.pdf (listing “the Federal
Reserve’s authority and responsibility to provide liquidity to the markets”
as first alternative to further SEC rule-making). For a discussion of the
way in which such Federal Reserve action would entail a subsidy to the
industry, see the discussion of the mechanics of the AMLF supra note 9
and accompanying text.
There are many variants of loss-absorbing capital. One proposal is for
the sale of bundled Class A/Class B units offered by one of the authors of
this paper in August 2011. Another is proposal by the Federal Reserve
staff calling for a “Minimum Balance at Risk” Requirement that similarly
envisions a hold-back for a period of time of a certain percentage of the
investor’s deposit into the fund, with an additional subordination
requirement for early-redeeming investors in the event of the fund’s
liquidation. Compare Jeffrey N. Gordon, Comment on Money Market
Funds for SEC (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 425, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133588, with Patrick McCabe et al.,
supra note 36.
The FSOC Proposed Recommendations included a
Minimum Balance at Risk proposal, supra note 25, at 69,469.
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accumulating NAV funds was not economically or
statistically significant. Focusing in particular on U.S.
dollar (“USD”) funds that provide the best institutional
comparison, our point estimate is that a 1% increase in yield
(e.g., from 2.00% to 2.02%) was associated with
approximately a 0.6% decrease in fund assets (e.g., from
$100 million to $99.4 million). Over the approximately 1.8%
yield range of the USD European MMFs (“EMMFs”), this
suggests that the highest-yielding funds on average should
have experienced asset contractions approximately 24%
greater than the lowest-yielding funds. To repeat, none of
the contraction was explained by the difference between
stable and accumulating NAV, indicating that NAV
“fixedness” did not contribute to the run.42
We also examine the performance of a subsample of USD
funds held out as following the portfolio constraints of SEC
Rule 2a-7, which makes for an even tighter comparison than
the full universe of USD EMMFs. Ex ante risk was more
strongly correlated with run risk during Lehman week for
this group of funds. Our point estimate is that a one%
increase in yield would explain an asset decrease of 2.85%.
Among these funds, the reported yield varied from 2.12% to
2.72%, which meant that the highest yielding funds should
have experienced asset contraction loss of 31% more than the
lowest yielding funds. The difference between stable NAV
and accumulating NAV funds was, once again, insignificant.
In a sense, these results should not be surprising.
Although in theory a bank run can be triggered by an event
uncorrelated with solvency risk (“sunspots”), the usual

42 On the debate as to whether bank runs are “panic-driven” or are
“information-based,” we find, “both.” Of the 19% contraction in USD
European prime MMFs, roughly 16% of that run is explained by firmspecific “information-based” factors in our models;; the rest is driven by
unobservables, probably meaning the external events. Compare Douglas
W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 405–11 (1983), with Charles J. Jacklin &
Sudipto Bhattacharya, Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based
Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications, 96 J. POL. ECON. 568, 570–89
(1988).
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liquidity of MMF assets means that MMF runs are, instead,
highly likely to be associated with correlated credit concerns
about money market instruments.43 Our conclusion is that
floating NAV will not address the credit concerns associated
with MMF assets.
Part II of this paper describes the prior literature on the
MMF run during fall 2008. Part III describes European
money market funds. Part IV describes our data and
provides descriptive statistics. Part V provides our results.
Part VI concludes. Part VI also provides a “policy coda” that
discusses the current SEC proposals, focusing on the
“fees/gates” proposal and addressing the need for MMFs to
develop the capacity to absorb loss apart from the implicit
sponsor guarantees that now stabilize the industry.

II. PRIOR LITERATURE
Post-2008 literature on money market funds tries to
understand the factors that led to the MMF run by looking
at various cross-sectional factors, such as yield, investor
characteristics, and sponsor characteristics of United Statesbased MMFs. Because all U.S. funds are, of course, fixed
NAV, there is no cross-sectional variation on this dimension.
We are aware of no prior study that looks at European
MMFs in this regard.
McCabe (2010) finds that three factors increased run
propensity: portfolio risk, proxied by average yield in the
year prior to Lehman week; sponsor risk, proxied by credit
default swap spreads; and investor risk, chiefly whether the

43 The report of the industry’s Money Market Working Group is also
instructive on this point. The Reserve Primary Fund was widely known to
be “reaching for yield” in the effort to attract deposits. In the year before
its failure, it significantly increased its holdings in higher yielding assetbacked commercial paper, giving it a meaningful yield advantage over its
competitors (almost fifty basis points in February 2008). This strategy
change moved the Reserve Fund’s yield from the bottom 20% of
institutional MMFs into the top 10%. In the July 2007–September 2008
period, its assets and market share roughly doubled. MONEY MARKET
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 54–58.

